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I. INTRODUCTION
FVOR MORE THAN thirty years, section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts has dominated the landscape of prod-
ucts liability law.' A majority of courts in jurisdictions across the
United States have considered and adopted, in some form, the
rule of section 402A, which makes product manufacturers and
retailers liable to consumers who are injured by defective prod-
ucts even though the seller exercised all possible care in prepar-
ing and selling the product.2 Such widespread acceptance of
section 402A has meant that the Restatement provision has played
a major role in shaping the understanding of products liability
law.'
In recent years, however, there have been rumblings that sec-
tion 402A is at odds with the current practice of products liabil-
ity law.' Scholars and jurists alike have criticized the Restatement
(Second) provision because it establishes a confusing standard of
liability-a standard that purports to be one of strict liability but
I See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512, 1512 n. 1
(1992) ("conservatively estimat[ing] that no fewer than 3,000 published court
opinions" cite section 402A).
2 See id. at 1512. See generally Roland F. Banks & Margaret O'Connor, Com-
mentary, Restating the Restatement (Second), Section 402A-Design Defect, 72 OR. L.
REv. 411, 421-23 (1993) (surveying the law of those states that have adopted sec-
tion 402A in some form).
3 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1512. For example, many manu-
facturers believe that strict liability in tort unfairly imposes liability in the absence
of negligence or malice and compels defendants to pay damages in excess of
their proportional responsibility. See, e.g., Mark Kuhlmann, Tort Reform in the Avi-
ation Industry, 10 AIR & SPACE LAW. 15 (1995). Consumers, and those who align
themselves with plaintiffs' interests, however, tend to view the products liability
system as one of the most important means by which innocent victims can re-
cover for injuries caused by defective products. See, e.g., Joseph T. Cook, The
Product Liability Crisis: Is It the Demise of Aviation Manufacturers? Two Myths from
Hell, 6 AIR & SPACE LAw. 1, 11 (1992).
4 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1512-13.
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that relies on traditional negligence principles, such as reasona-
bleness, to explain its application.5 Scholars have also found
fault with section 402A because it fails to distinguish different
types of product defects.6 In 1994, the American Law Institute
(ALI) acknowledged that section 402A was out of date and un-
dertook to find a better way to describe the law of products lia-
bility.7 After several years of intense debate and lobbying,8 the
ALI approved a Final Draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability.9
Today, significant changes in products liability law loom on
the horizon. This Comment will trace the history of section
402A and examine the current state of products liability law
under the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Then, it will review the
Proposed Final Draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability, and consider how adoption of the revised Restatement
might affect products liability law as it applies to manufacturing
and design defect cases and failure to give adequate warning or
instruction cases. 10
5See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Restating the Law: The Dilemmas of Products Liability,
30 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 197, 204 (1997). Section 402A has also been criticized
because it adopts an "all-or-nothing" approach to contributory fault and because
it fails to address whether liability under its provisions extends to bystanders. See
id. See also William A. Dreier, Design Defects Under the Proposed Section 2(b) of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability-A Judge's View, 30 U. MICH.J.L. REF.
221, 222-23 (1997).
6 See Dreier, supra note 5, at 222.
7 See id. (explaining that the job of the ALI is "to find a better way to describe
an existing area of the law so that attorneys can advise clients, judges can charge
juries, and professors can instruct students, all with more precision").
8 See Al Wraps Up Product Liability Project, New UCC Article on Licenses Makes
Debut, 65 U.S.L.W. 2777,June 3, 1997. U.S. Law Week quotes one of the Report-
ers as saying "[the Reporters] listened to everyone, defense attorneys, plaintiffs'
attorneys, academics. Their fingerprints are all over [the Restatement (Third)]."
See id.
9 Id. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Proposed Final
Draft, 1997) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. The ALI expects that the re-
vised Restatement will be published and available to courts and practitioners in
1998. See ALI Wraps Up Product Liability Project, supra note 8, at 2777.
10 This Comment will not consider the Restatement (Third) rules of liability
that apply to special products or product markets (prescription drugs and medi-
cal devices, food products, and used products) or the new rules for liability of
commercial product sellers not based on product defects at the time of sale. RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) § 5-11.
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II. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
SECTION 402A
A. TOWARDS SECTION 402A: THE HISTORY OF LIABILITY OF
SELLERS OF DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS
1. From Non-Liability to Strict Liability Under Warranty
Early common law substantially insulated manufacturers and
suppliers of defective products from liability.1" Driven by a de-
sire to cut off a potential flood of litigation, courts required priv-
ity of contract between the manufacturer or supplier and the
plaintiff as a prerequisite to recovery.' 2 As many persons who
had been injured by defective products had not entered into
any contract with the manufacturer or supplier, most early prod-
ucts suits ended in a judgment for the defendant. 3
Because lack of privity often barred recovery in products cases
where the manufacturer was clearly negligent, American courts
began to develop exceptions to the privity requirement." In
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,' 5 Judge Cardozo effectively abol-
11 See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch.
1842). Winterbottom is frequently cited as standing for the general rule that a
manufacturer or supplier was not liable for negligence to persons injured by a
product absent a contractual relationship. Winterbottom was a mail coach
driver; his employer had contracted with the Postmaster General to supply horses
and drivers to deliver the mail. See id. at 109. The defendant also had a contract
with the Postmaster General to supply the coaches and keep them in good repair.
See id. Winterbottom was injured when one of the coaches broke down. See id.
He sued the defendant for negligently failing to carry out his duties of mainte-
nance and repair. See id. The court denied liability as a matter of law. See id. at
114.
12 See id.
[Ijf the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person pass-
ing along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach,
might bring a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of
such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the
most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no
limit, would ensue.
Id.
13 See Philip H. Corboy, The Not-So-Quiet Revolution: Rebuilding Barriers to Jury
Trial in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REV.
1043, 1048 (1994) ("No-duty rules, epitomized by the privity requirement, per-
mittedjudges to dismiss cases as a matter of law regardless of the defectiveness of
the product.").
14 See id. at 1049; see also Cornelius W. Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37
OR. L. REv. 119, 153-55 (1958) (listing 29 historical exceptions to the privity
requirement).
15 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). MacPherson was injured when the automobile
he was driving suddenly collapsed; one of the wheels the defendant manufacturer
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ished the privity requirement by announcing that a manufac-
turer or a supplier of a potentially dangerous product was under
a duty to all foreseeable users to exercise reasonable care in the
manufacture and supply of the product, regardless of the exist-
ence or nonexistence of a contract.16 The duty would arise
when the defendant had knowledge of a danger and knowledge
that, in the usual course of events, the danger would be shared
by persons other than the buyer."7 A product was considered
dangerous if it was "reasonably certain to place life and limb in
peril when negligently made."' 8 As other courts began to recog-
nize similar duties to avoid injury where danger could be fore-
seen, injured plaintiffs' chances of success against product
sellers increased; however, other barriers to recovery under a
negligence theory remained.19 For example, plaintiffs still faced
the burden of producing evidence of the manufacturer's negli-
gence.2" To further aid plaintiffs, courts liberalized their appli-
cation of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine 21 and developed the rule
had used was made of defective wood, which crumbled into fragments. See id. at
1051. Though no contract existed between MacPherson and the manufacturer,
the court found that the defect could have been discovered upon reasonable
inspection and that failure to conduct such an inspection in the context of a
potentially dangerous product, such as an automobile, was negligence. See id.
16 See id. at 1056-57.
17 See id. at 1056.
18 Id.
19 See id. MacPherson did not relieve plaintiffs from the burden of proving that
the product defect resulted from the manufacturer's failure to use reasonable
care, nor from the requirement of proving that the defect proximately caused the
product failure and the resulting injury.
20 See Corboy, supra note 13, at 1048-49 (arguing that manufacturers were able
to evade liability because "the evidence of negligence was generally within [their]
own control").
21 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur provides an inference of negligence where
the plaintiff proves that the instrumentality that caused the injury was in the de-
fendant's exclusive control, and the accident was one which ordinarily does not
happen in the absence of negligence. See generally Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 150 P.2d 436, 438 (Cal. 1944). The plaintiff in Escola was a waitress who was
injured when a pop bottle exploded in her hand. See id. at 437. She alleged that
the explosion was due either to the bottler's negligence in manufacturing the
glass bottle or its negligence in creating excessive pressure inside the bottle, but
she was unable to prove any specific acts of negligence. See id. The court allowed
the plaintiff to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur even though the defend-
ant did not have exclusive control over the bottle when it exploded. See id. at
438. The court reasoned that the doctrine should apply when "defendant had
control [of the instrumentality causing the injury] at the time of the alleged neg-
ligent act, although not at the time of the accident, provided plaintiff first proves
that the condition of the instrumentality had not been changed after it left the
defendant's possession." Id. (emphasis in the original).
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of strict liability.22
Strict liability for defective products was first achieved under
warranty in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.2 3 The Henning-
sen decision established that a plaintiff may recover for injuries
caused by a defendant's product despite the plaintiffs inability
to prove that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in
manufacturing and selling the product.24 The court ruled that
where a manufacturer or a dealer puts a new product into the
stream of commerce and promotes its purchase by the public,
an implied warranty that the product is reasonably suitable for
use accompanies the product into the hands of the ultimate pur-
chaser.2 5 By eliminating the necessity of proving negligence, the
court subjected sellers to strict liability.26
Henningsen thus signaled the genesis of strict products liabil-
ity. This rule, however, did not receive immediate acceptance;
courts and commentators were not satisfied that the doctrine, as
expressed in warranty terms, afforded enough protection to in-
jured plaintiffs. 27 While strict liability in warranty relieved a
plaintiff from the burden of proving negligence, they argued, it
did not exempt her from the requirement of establishing priv-
22 See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978) ("[O]ne of the
principal purposes behind the strict product liability doctrine is to relieve an in-
jured plaintiff of many of the onerous evidentiary burdens inherent in a negli-
gence cause of action.").
23 161 A.2d 69 (NJ. 1960). See also Corboy, supra note 13, at 1049.
24 The Henningsen court held an automobile manufacturer and a dealer liable
to a plaintiff who was injured in one of their cars. The plaintiff, whose husband
had purchased a new Plymouth from the defendant dealer twelve days earlier,
was driving the car when she heard a loud noise come from under the hood and
felt the steering wheel spin in her hands; the car veered sharply and crashed into
a highway sign and a brick wall. See Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 75.
25 See id. at 83. While the court held that the privity requirement would not be
strictly applied so as to defeat a plaintiff's recovery under such an implied war-
ranty, it did not completely eliminate the privity requirement from the warranty
cause of action. Rather, the court ruled that the implied warranty of
merchantability extends to the purchaser of the product, members of his or her
family, and to other persons who might be expected by the parties to the war-
ranty to become users of the product. See id. at 100. In Henningsen, the privity
requirement threatened to bar recovery because the plaintiff's husband was the
only "purchaser" of the new car; the plaintiff herself did notjoin in executing the
contract for sale. See id. at 73.
26 See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REv. 791, 793 (1966) [hereinafter Prosser, The Fall].
27 Strict liability in warranty was attacked as cumbersome and expensive to liti-
gate. See William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE LJ. 1099, 1123 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser, The Assault].
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ity.28 Rather than adopting the Henningsen rule, many courts
continued to search for a rule that would provide the benefits of
strict liability, but not at the expense of the advances that had
been made under the negligence cause of action.29
2. Arguments for Strict Liability in Tort
In the early 1960s, when William Prosser began drafting the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, products liability had barely
emerged as a distinct legal concept.30 Prosser, however, had al-
ready determined that his goal for the fledgling concept would
be to establish strict liability for defective products under the
heading of torts.3' Prosser preferred strict liability in tort be-
cause of the efficient manner in which the doctrine could be
administered and because it presented fewer obstacles to plain-
tiff recovery than a warranty cause of action.32 In his well-known
law review article, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), Prosser identified seven courts that held product sell-
ers liable for injuries resulting from the use of their products
despite proof that the sellers had exercised all possible care and
the fact that the users had not entered into any contract with the
sellers.33 Looking at these decisions, Prosser discerned a trend
toward strict liability in tort for injuries caused by defective prod-
ucts34 and argued that such a "trend" justified the incorporation
of the strict liability standard in the Restatement (Second).3 5
28 A combined reading of several U.C.C. provisions suggests that implied war-
ranties run only between sellers and purchasers: "a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant
with respect to goods of that kind." U.C.C. § 2-314 (1990) (emphasis added). A
"sale" is defined in the U.C.C. as "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer
for a price." Id. § 2-106.
29 See Prosser, The Fall, supra note 26, at 800 (arguing for recognition of strict
liability in tort).
30 See Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI Restate-
ment Project, 48 VAND. L. Rrv. 631, 637 (1995); see also Prosser, The Assault, supra
note 27, at 1112-13 (identifying a handful of jurisdictions that had established
something similar to strict liability in tort in products cases by 1960).
31 See Shapo, supra note 30, at 637.
32 See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. m (1965)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
33 See Prosser, The Assault, supra note 27, at 1112-13.
4 See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. b ("Beginning in 1958
.a number of recent decisions have.., extended the rule of strict liability to
cover the sale of any product which, if it should prove to be defective, may be
expected to cause physical harm to the consumer or his property.").
35 See Prosser, The Assault, supra note 27, at 1099. Several present day scholars
argue that the problems of section 402A stem from the fact that Prosser used the
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Prosser maintained that "the public interest in human life,
health, and safety" demanded that product users receive the
maximum possible protection that the law could provide. 6 In a
products case, strict liability in tort presents the fewest barriers
to plaintiff recovery and, thus, provides more protection to con-
sumers than other theories of liability.37 The complexities of
the manufacturing process make negligence on the part of a
defendant manufacturer extremely difficult to prove. Under a
traditional negligence approach, many deserving plaintiffs fail
to recover because they lack access to the same information, ex-
pertise, and resources that the defendants control. In cases
where the product is defective, but the suppliers, wholesalers,
and retailers exercise reasonable care in selling it, a pure negli-
gence theory bars recovery; because the supplier is under no
duty to inspect or test the product, it could not be liable for
negligently failing to notice a manufacturing defect.39 Strict lia-
bility relieves consumers from the burden of proving negli-
gence. Even where the plaintiff could establish that the product
was defective, the actual manufacturer was often unknown or
judgment proof.40 Thus, Prosser favored strict liability in tort
because it increased an injured plaintiff's chances of recovery.41
Restatement (Second) to state what he thought the law should be rather than to
restate what the law actually said. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 5, at 204 (character-
izing section 402A as an anomaly, "a 'restatement' before there was any law to
restate").
36 See Prosser, The Assault, supra note 27, at 1122.
37 With a strict liability theory, a plaintiff does not have to prove the defend-
ant's negligence, nor does she have to prove privity.
38 SeeJohn F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns
a "New Cloth"for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the States
Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 493, 508 (1996) [hereinafter Vargo,
New Clothes].
39 See Prosser, The Assault, supra note 27, at 1117. Moreover, a product's pack-
aging prevents suppliers from inspecting the product; a retailer could not look
for a product defect without opening the packaging and destroying the accompa-
nying advertisements. See id.
40 See id.
41 See id.; Shapo, supra note 30, at 689 ("Another idea supporting the develop-
ment of section 402A inheres in the supposition that the traditional negligence
rules of proof create hurdles that are too high for many plaintiffs with meritori-
ous cases."). Prosser further determined that strict liability was justified on fair-
ness principles where the manufacturer or supplier sought to avoid responsibility
to injured persons who had been induced to believe that the product was suitable
and safe for use by the manufacturer's marketing and advertising. See Prosser,
The Assault, supra note 27, at 1123; see also Escola, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor, J.,
concurring) (Because consumer "vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of
manufacturers to build up confidence [in the product's safety] by advertising
216
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Prosser also adopted policy arguments from the Henningsen
decision to support the Restatement (Second) proposal for strict
liability in tort.42 Prosser believed that Henningsen stood for the
policy that "the burden of losses... [should be] borne by those
who are in a position to either control the danger or make an
equitable distribution of the losses when they do occur."4" In-
deed, the Henningsen court stated that manufacturer liability
should rest upon the "demands of social justice"44 and reasoned
that the greater burden must be placed upon manufacturers
and suppliers because they occupy dominant positions in rela-
tion to the consumer: "[u]nder modern conditions, the ordi-
nary layman,... has neither the opportunity nor the capacity to
inspect or to determine the fitness of [a product] for use; he
must rely on the manufacturer who has control of [the prod-
uct's] construction .... ""5 Moreover, as between the manufac-
turer and the ultimate user, the manufacturer is in a better
position to absorb the risk as it can pass any losses onto the com-
munity through price increases. 46 This burden-shifting, or "risk-
spreading," rationale would become the foundation principle of
section 402A.47
and marketing devices .... ," consumers "no longer approach products warily but
accept them on faith ...... Therefore, manufacturers must assume a greater
responsibility for their products.).
42 See Prosser, The Fall, supra note 26, at 791. (proclaiming that the Citadel
barrier to plaintiff recovery fell with Henningsen).
43 Id. at 793 (quoting Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 81). Justice Traynor made a
similar argument in his concurring opinion in Escolw, he argued that "public pol-
icy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce
the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the mar-
ket." Escola, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
- Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 83 (quoting Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633,
635 (Wash. 1913)).
45 Id. The Henningsen court also invalidated the defendant's attempted dis-
claimer of the implied warranty for similar policy reasons:
the automobile manufacturer [may not] use its grossly dispropor-
tionate bargaining power to relieve itself from liability and to im-
pose on the ordinary buyer, who in effect has no real freedom of
choice, the grave danger of injury to himself and others that at-
tends the sale of such a dangerous instrumentality as a defectively
made automobile.
Id. at 95.
46 See Prosser, The Assault, supra note 27, at 1120; see also Escola, 150 P.2d at 440-
41 (Traynor, J., concurring). Justice Traynor argued that the cost of a product-
related injury to an unsuspecting consumer could be anticipated by a manufac-
turer and, thus, insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as
a cost of doing business. See id.
47 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. c.
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B. STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT ACHIEVED
1. A Statement of the Rule
The first major decision to recognize strict liability in tort,
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,48 relied on many of the
same policy considerations that Prosser outlined in The Assault
Upon the Citadel and in his drafts of section 402A.49 The Green-
man court expressly adopted the risk-spreading rationale as the
justification for imposing strict liability in tort: "[t]he purpose
of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that
put such products on the market rather than by the injured per-
sons who are powerless to protect themselves." 50  Ultimately,
Greenman held that public policy required manufacturer liability
for defective products to be governed by the law of strict liability
in tort, rather than by the law of contract warranties.5"
Almost three years after Greenman, the ALI formally adopted
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.5 2 Section 402A
clearly establishes strict liability in tort without using warranty
language: 53
48 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). In Greenman, the plaintiff was severely injured by a
combination power tool, when a piece of wood he was working on flew out of the
machine and hit him on the forehead. See id. at 898. Substantial evidence sup-
ported the finding that the tool was defectively designed and that a reasonable
alternative design existed: normal use caused vibrations that resulted in the lathe
moving away from the piece of wood being worked on, permitting the wood to fly
out; experts testified that there were other more positive ways of fastening the
parts together which would have prevented the accident. See id. at 899. The
court held that the jury could have concluded that statements in the manufac-
turer's brochure claiming that the tool "provid [ed] rigid support" and that "every
component has positive locks that hold adjustments through rough or precision
work" probably created an expectation in the plaintiff's mind and that the injury
resulted from the product's failure to meet those expectations. Id. at 899, 899
n.1.
49 See generally Corboy, supra note 13, at 1050 (noting the "remarkable cross-
fertilization of ideas" between Justice Traynor, author of the Greenman decision,
and Prosser); John W. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33
VAND. L. REv. 551, 554-57 (1980).
50 Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901.
51 See id. at 900. The Greenman court rejected the manufacturer's defense
based on failure to give notice of breach of warranty and imposed strict liability
in tort. See id.
52 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A.
53 See id. cmt. a. ("The rule is one of strict liability .... ); Prosser recognized
that "[a] number of courts [in their search for a theoretical basis for imposing
strict liability in products cases] ... have resorted to a 'warranty'." Id. cmt. m.
Thus, Prosser carefully drafted section 402A so as not to prevent any court from
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(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his prop-
erty is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it
is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller.54
The protection afforded by the rule of section 402A extends
to all users and consumers of the product.55 Comment I reiter-
ates that this rule of strict liability does not require any contrac-
tual relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant; the
rule does not require the plaintiff to have purchased the prod-
uct from the defendant or to have purchased the product at
all.56 "Consumers" include those who consume the product as
well as those who prepare the product for consumption, and
"users" encompasses those who actually use the product as well
as those who passively enjoy the benefit of the product.57
Section 402A imposes strict liability only upon those persons
"engaged in the business of selling products for use or consump-
tion."58 Comment f clarifies the rule's intention to target manu-
facturers, wholesalers, retail dealers, and distributors.59  A
person who occasionally sells a product, but is not engaged in
treating the stated rule as a matter of warranty. In comment m, however, Prosser
warns that if a court decides to treat this rule of liability as a matter of warranty,
"it should be recognized and understood that the 'warranty' is a very different
kind of warranty from those usually found in the sale of goods, and that it is not
subject to the various contract rules which have grown up to surround such
sales." Id. Such rules may include provisions of the Uniform Sales Act or the
Uniform Commercial Code, common law limitations on the scope and content of
warranties, notice requirements, disclaimers, and the validity of the contract. See
id.
54 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A.
55 See id. cmt. L
56 See id.
57 Id. (including passengers in an automobile or airplane).
58 Id. cmt. f.
59 See id.
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that activity as a part of his or her business is not subject to the
rule of strict liability. 60 The Restatement (Second) justifies this dis-
tinction by pointing out that occasional sellers do not share the
"special responsibility" of those engaged in the business of sup-
plying people with products which may endanger their personal
safety; consumers are not forced to rely on the occasional seller
for product safety the same way they must trust that manufactur-
ers and retailers will provide safe products. 61
While section 402A aimed to increase consumer protection, it
did not propose to make manufacturers insurers of their prod-
ucts. Therefore, section 402A recognizes a few "defenses" to
claims that may arise under the rule.62 First, a seller will not be
liable where the product leaves the seller in a safe condition, but
becomes harmful through subsequent mishandling.6" Further-
more, a defendant may be relieved of liability where the plaintiff
makes substantial modifications to the original product.64 Con-
tributory negligence, in the form of assumption of risk, is also a
6 See id. (giving as examples of "occasional sellers" a housewife who sells ajar
of jam and a car owner who sells his car to a used car dealer).
61 See id.
62 See Frank J. Vandall, "Design Defect" in Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence
and Strict Liability, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 61, 74 (1982) ("strict liability is not
insurance").
63 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. g. For example, a manufacturer of
beverages who packages his product in reasonably safe glass bottles would not be
liable to a person who is injured while trying to open the bottle by banging it
against a table. See id. cmt. h. For a product to be in a safe condition at the time
it leaves the seller, the seller must properly package the product and take other
precautions "to permit the product to remain safe for a normal length of time
when handled in a normal manner." Id. cmt. g; see also David G. Owen, The Gray-
ing of Products Liability Law: Paths Taken and Untaken in the New Restatement, 61
TENN. L. REv. 1241, 1259 n. 67 (1994) [hereinafter Owen, The Graying] (citing
Mary Fisk, An Interview with John Byington, TRIAL, Feb. 1978, at 25, for the proposi-
tion that consumer misconduct likely accounts for more product accidents than
does defectiveness).
64 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. p. Because of a lack of decisions
addressing the possible liability of a seller in situations where the product under-
went substantial changes after it left the hands of the seller, the ALI refused to
take a position on whether strict liability would apply in such cases. See id. Com-
ment p states that a seller probably would be responsible where the changes
made to the product were minor, such as modifications made when tuning or
servicing a product like a car. See id. There is a suggestion, however, that a seller
would not be liable where significant modifications have been made to the origi-
nal product. See id. The analysis requires a case-by-case determination of
"whether the responsibility for discovery and prevention of the dangerous defect
is shifted to the intermediate party who is to make the changes." Id.
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defense. 65 Where a plaintiff is contributorily negligent in failing
to discover the defect in a product, however, she will not be
barred from recovery. 66 Finally, the rule set out in the Restate-
ment (Second) is one of strict liability,' not absolute liability; sec-
tion 402A recognizes that many products cannot be made
entirely safe for all purposes.67 A plaintiff may recover under
section 402A only where the defendant's product is defective
and unreasonably dangerous.68
Commentj imposes a further requirement on sellers to warn
consumers about those products that contain an element or in-
gredient whose danger is not generally known or is one that a
consumer would not reasonably expect to find in the product.69
A seller's failure to give an adequate warning about the nature
of a product or to provide directions as to its use will make a
product unreasonably dangerous.7 ° Where a seller adequately
warns consumers of the potential dangers of a product, and the
product is otherwise safe for use when the warnings are heeded,
the product is not defective. 7'
The rule of strict liability in tort affords ordinary people maxi-
mum protection from defective products. It relieves injured
plaintiffs from the burdens of proving negligence and increases
the likelihood that the plaintiff will recover. Liability under the
rule extends to a wide class of potential defendants and an even
larger group of possible plaintiffs. Overall, section 402A repre-
sents the high water mark of the pro-consumer movement in
products liability. 72
65 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. n. A plaintiff should share the re-
sponsibility for her injury when she has been negligent in "voluntarily and unrea-
sonably proceeding to encounter a known danger." Id. This defense is the same
as in other cases of strict liability. Id.
66 See id.
67 See id. cmt. i. (listing ordinary sugar, and uncontaminated whiskey, tobacco,
and butter as examples).
68 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A(1).
69 See id. cmt. j.
70 See id.
71 See id. (Where an adequate warning is given, the seller may assume it was
read and heeded.).
72 See Vargo, New Clothes, supra note 38, at 507.
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2. Section 402A in Practice
A majority ofjurisdictions adopted verbatim the strict liability
standard of section 402A"3 holding product sellers responsible
for injuries caused by products sold "in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user."74 Despite this apparent
consensus on manufacturer and retailer liability, courts have dif-
fered greatly in their application of the standard.7 5 The various
jurisdictions have developed three distinct tests for determining
whether a product is "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous":
the consumer expectations test, the risk-benefit test, and the
combination test.76
a. The Consumer Expectations Test
In developing the consumer expectations test, courts focused
on the Reporter's comments to section 402A.77 Comment g, for
example, explains that "in a defective condition" means "in a
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which
will be unreasonably dangerous to him."78 Comment i further
defines "unreasonably dangerous" as "dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary con-
sumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to its characteristics." 79 Thus, in jurisdic-
tions that follow the consumer expectations approach, a defec-
73 See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3D § 16:9 (Timothy E. Travers et
al. eds., 1987) (identifying 33 jurisdictions that have adopted § 402A).
74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A(1).
75 See generally Vargo, New Clothes, supra note 38, at 559-949 (surveying the com-
mon law, statutes, and pattern jury instructions of all fifty states with respect to
the question of the standard for design defects).
76 See Banks & O'Connor, supra note 2, at 420-23 (listing the various jurisdic-
tions that apply the consumer expectations test and those that apply the risk-
utility test). But see Vargo, New Clothes, supra note 38, at 538-47 (identifying
slightly more discrete categories: the ordinary consumer expectation test; the
modified consumer expectation test; the pure risk-utility test; the Wade test; the
pure Barker test; and the modified Barker test).
77 Many decisions simply incorporate, wholesale, the definitions of "defective"
and "unreasonably dangerous" from the comments to section 402A. See, e.g.,
Morris v. Adolph Coors Co., 735 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987,
writ ref'd) (specifically adopting the language of comments h, i, and j as the
standard for determining defectiveness and unreasonable danger).
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. g.
79 Id. cmt. i.
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tive product is one that fails to meet an ordinary consumer's
reasonable expectations of safety. s0
In applying the consumer expectations test, the question of
whether a product is unreasonably dangerous is a question of
fact for the jury to determine in light of the standard of safety
they, as ordinary consumers, would expect from the product.8
To illustrate this concept, consider Gigho v. Connecticut Light and
Power Co.,8 2 a case involving the question of whether a gas-oper-
ated home furnace was defective because the manufacturer
failed to warn consumers of the possibility that the furnace
could shoot flames.83 The Giglio court left to the jury the ques-
tion of whether the furnace was defective, stating that "the jury
can draw their own reasonable conclusions as to the expecta-
tions of the ordinary consumer and the knowledge common in
the community at large."84 The jury concluded that the furnace
was more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would have
contemplated and, therefore, the failure of the manufacturer to
warn of the risk of shooting flames made the product
defective.85
80 See, e.g., Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Toomey, 521 So. 2d 971 (Ala. 1988) (af-
firming a one million dollar judgment against Harley-Davidson for injuries sus-
tained in an accident where the plaintiff collided with an oncoming car because
he could not see out of his motorcycle helmet; the helmet was found to be defec-
tive in design because an ordinary consumer would reasonably expect the helmet
to be designed so as not to fog over and to be easy to remove). Professor Vargo
distinguishes between an "ordinary consumer expectations" test and a "modified
consumer expectations" test. See Vargo, New Clothes, supra note 38, at 538-41.
Under the ordinary consumer expectations test, liability would attach when an
ordinary consumer found the product to be too dangerous. See id. at 539. This
approach proved problematic when the product danger was obvious, because
there could be no expectation of safety; an absence of expectations as to safety
meant that strict liability would not apply. See id. The "modified consumer ex-
pectation" test incorporates risk-utility factors and focuses on reasonable expecta-
tions rather than ordinary expectations. See id. at 540. Liability attaches when a
reasonable consumer, supplied with information about the product's dangers
and benefits, determines that the risks outweigh the benefits. See id.
81 See, e.g., Giglio v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 429 A.2d 486, 489 (Conn.
1980).
82 429 A.2d 486 (Conn. 1980).
83 See id. at 488. The plaintiff was severely burned when she opened the fur-
nace door to see if the pilot light was lit; the indicator designed to tell whether
the pilot light was on (silver display) or off (red display) showed partially red and
partially silver. See id. at 487.
84 Id. at 489 (citing Slepski v. Williams Ford, Inc., 364 A.2d 175, 178 (Conn.
1975)).
85 See id. at 488.
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Though the consumer expectations test seems reliable and
easy to administer, some courts have rejected this approach be-
cause it does not go far enough to protect consumer interests. 86
The same court that decided Greenman criticized the test for
treating consumer expectations "as a 'ceiling' on a manufac-
turer's responsibility... rather than as a 'floor'." 8 While admit-
ting that "ordinary consumer expectations are frequently of
direct significance to the defectiveness issue," the court warns
that such expectations establish only a minimum safety standard
that a product must meet to avoid being found defective.8" Fur-
thermore, the consumer expectations test has drawn criticism
from commentators who have observed that the "unreasonably
dangerous" language may mislead jurors into believing that a
product must be "abnormally dangerous" or extremely danger-
ous in order for liability to attach.8 9
b. The Risk-Benefit Test
Other jurisdictions have found that the proper application of
section 402A in determining whether a product is unreasonably
dangerous involves balancing the danger a particular product
creates against the gains it produces for society.90 Courts often
justify this risk-benefit test by explaining that the strict liability
standard does not transform the seller into an insurer of his
product, therefore, there must be some balancing of danger
against usefulness.9 ' Moreover, some courts prefer the risk-ben-
efit test because they believe it provides flexibility and achieves
an appropriate balance among the competing interests of manu-
facturers, consumers, and the public.9 2
86 See, e.g., Barker, 573 P.2d at 451-55.
87 Id. at 451 n.7.
88 See id.
89 See John Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825, 832 (1973).
90 See, e.g., Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990) (in-
terpreting state common law to permit a plaintiff to pursue a design defect claim
by showing that the risks posed by a product outweigh the value of the product's
utility). But seeJohn Vargo, Caveat Emptor: Will the A.L.I. Erode Strict Liability in the
Restatement (Third) for Products Liability, 10 TOURO L. REv. 21, 49 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Vargo, Caveat Emptor] ("The ability of economists to place an economic value
on anything is doubtful.") (citing John Vargo, The American Rule in Attorney Fee
Allocation: The Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 1567, 1627-28
(1993)).
91 See Vandall, supra note 62, at 74.
92 See Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1252 (citing O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298
(NJ. 1983)).
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Most courts that adhere to the risk-benefit approach agree
that proper application of the test requires more than the single
question of whether a product's benefits outweigh the dangers it
creates.93 For example, in Armentrout v. FMC Corp.,94 the court
considered the risk-benefit issue in light of several factors repre-
senting different policy concerns.95 Such factors included
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to
the user and to the public as a whole; (2) The safety aspects of
the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury and the
probable seriousness of the injury; (3) The availability of the sub-
stitute product which would meet the same need and not be as
unsafe; (4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe
character of the product without impairing its usefulness or mak-
ing it too expensive to maintain its utility; (5) The user's ability to
avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product;
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in
the product and their avoidability because of general public
knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the
existence of suitable warnings or instructions; (7) The feasibility,
on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting
the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.96
The court noted that the list was not exclusive and that the spe-
cific factors to be considered would vary depending on the facts
of the case; some situations might require consideration of
more or fewer factors. 97
The Armentrout court, and other courts that have adopted the
risk-utility approach to determine whether a product is unrea-
93 See, e.g., Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 183-84 (Colo. 1992) ("In
order to determine whether the risks outweigh the benefits of the product de-
sign, the jury must consider different interests, represented by certain factors.").
94 842 P.2d 175, 183-84 (Colo. 1992).
95 See id. In Armentrout, the plaintiffs husband, a construction worker, suffered
serious injuries when he was struck by the rotating upper portion of a crane. See
id. at 178. The plaintiff alleged that the crane, which was not equipped with a
bell to alert people that it was moving, was unreasonably dangerous. See id. The
court analyzed whether the risk of injury created by the crane's design exceeded
the benefits of the design and, thus, made the crane unreasonably unsafe. See id.
at 181-85.
96 Id. at 184. But see Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 849
(Tex. 1979) (rejecting a balancing test that enumerates factors to be considered
because of the difficulty of formulating an appropriate series of factors).
97 See Armentrout, 842 P.2d at 184. Cf Aaron D. Twerski, Seizing the Middle
Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed
Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 521, 527 (1982) (proposing an
alternative list of factors to consider in weighing the risks and benefits of a prod-
uct design).
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sonably dangerous, relied heavily on John Wade's On the Nature
of Strict Tort Liability for Products.9" Wade first suggested the seven
factors to be considered in determining whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous.99 The basis of Wade's risk-utility ap-
proach was that courts needed to use a "tort way of thinking"
and "tort terminology" in strict liability cases.100 This required
framing jury issues in terms of what a reasonably prudent person
would do under the same or similar circumstances. 10 1 Wade did
not recommend giving the list of factors to the jury as instruc-
tions; rather, he proposed that the jury be given a single instruc-
tion explaining that "a product is [unreasonably dangerous and
defective] if it is so likely to be harmful to persons . . . that a
reasonable prudent manufacturer . . ., who had actual knowl-
edge of its harmful character would not place it on the
market."1 0 2
Under the risk-benefit approach, if after weighing all of the
factors, a fact-finder decides that the risks of the product's de-
sign are greater than its benefits, the product is unreasonably
dangerous and the manufacturer should be held strictly liable
for injuries caused by the product.10 3 This analysis seems strik-
ingly similar to the long-recognized negligence analysis de-
scribed by Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.10 4
98 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973); see Armentrout, 842 P.2d at 183-84. Professor Vargo
distinguishes a "pure risk-utility test" from the "Wade test." Vargo, New Clothes,
supra note 38, at 541-46. "The pure test considers only risk-utility factors." Id. at
545. The Wade test "first imputes knowledge of the product's danger to the man-
ufacturer" and then balances product risks against product utilities. Id.
99 Wade, supra note 98, at 837-38.
100 Id. at 834. Wade analogized strict liability in tort to the doctrine of negli-
gence per se and suggested that courts assume the defendant knew of the dan-
gerous condition of the product and ask "whether the magnitude of the risk
created by the dangerous condition of the product was outweighed by the social
utility attained by putting it out in this fashion." Id. at 835. In the design context,
whatever showing would be sufficient to establish that the product is so danger-
ous that strict liability should apply would be enough to establish negligence on
the part of the manufacturer in putting the product on the market. See id. at 836.
101 See id. at 840. Wade rejected the consumer expectation approach as being
derivative of the language of warranty cases. Id. at 829. Under a warranty ap-
proach, the reasonable expectations of the buyer served as guidelines for
whether the manufacturer had breached the covenant that the goods were suita-
ble for the purpose for which they were sold; however, in design matters, a con-
sumer would not know what to expect because he would have no idea how safe a
product could be made. See id.
102 Id. at 839-40.
103 See Armnentrout, 842 P.2d at 184.
104 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (announcing the famous B<PL formula, where
liability depends on whether the probability and severity of the injury are greater
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Some jurisdictions admit that the balancing tests in the negli-
gence and strict liability contexts look similar, but clarify the dis-
tinction by insisting that in the products liability context the
focus is on the product alone, while in the negligence context,
the focus is on the conduct of the manufacturer and its decision
to make and market the product. ' °0
c. The Combination Test
In struggling with the different approaches to section 402A,
some jurisdictions have found that neither the consumer expec-
tations test, nor the risk-benefit analysis adequately addresses all
of the problems encountered in products liability cases.' 06 Many
jurisdictions reaching such conclusions have combined the two
tests.1 0 7 For example, in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,1 °8 the
court held that the consumer expectations test could not be re-
lied upon as the exclusive test for determining whether a prod-
uct was defective and unreasonably dangerous.10 9 Instead, the
court established that a product may be found to be defective in
design under either of the two alternative tests: a product con-
tains a design defect if (1) it fails to perform as safely as an ordi-
nary consumer would expect, or (2) the risks of danger inherent
in the product design outweigh the benefits and usefulness of
the product. '0 The Barker court reasoned that because an ordi-
than the burden to take adequate precautions); see Gary T. Schwartz, The Begin-
ning and Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. Rv. 601,
625 (1992) (arguing that current design defect law, in which the risk-benefit test
plays a primary role, contains a basic core of negligence reasoning). But see
Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30 VAL. U. L.
REv. 859, 865 (1996) (arguing that the Learned Hand test is significantly differ-
ent from the risk-utility test applied in products liability cases because the Restate-
ment test imposes liability on the basis of what is now known, rather than on the
basis of what the producer knew or should have known at the time the product
was designed).
105 See, e.g., Barker, 573 P.2d at 457.
106 See, e.g., id. at 454-56.
107 See, e.g., id.
108 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
109 The plaintiff in Barker was injured by falling lumber when the high lift
loader he was operating began to tip and forced him to jump from the loader.
See id. at 447. Barker alleged that the loader was defective because it was unstable
and had a tendency to roll. See id. The court refused to rely solely on the con-
sumer expectations test because it concluded that such a test established only a
minimum standard of product safety. See id. at 454-56.
110 See id. at 456. Professor Vargo distinguishes between a "pure Barker test,"
which shifts the burden of proving the product's risk and utility to the defendant,
and a "modified Barker test," which does not shift the burden of proof in balanc-
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nary consumer often would have no expectations of product
safety, the consumer expectations test would be impracticable in
many cases.1 1' Barker also rejected singular reliance on the con-
sumer expectations test because it could limit the application of
strict liability to those products that turned out to be more dan-
gerous than the average consumer had contemplated. 1 2 Such a
limitation would preclude recovery when a person was injured
by a product that an ordinary consumer may have thought in-
volved some risk of danger or injury."' In other words, the
Barker court concluded that a product could still be unreasona-
bly dangerous, and its manufacturer should be strictly liable for
injuries the product caused, even though the average consumer
might expect the product to involve some inherent risk; a manu-
facturer should not be protected from liability when it markets
an unsafe product that meets everyone's expectation of
danger." 4
d. Types of Product Defects
Though the language of section 402A does not distinguish
types of product defects, courts in their application of the rule
have tended to differentiate among manufacturing defects, de-
sign defects, and products that are defective because of inade-
quate warnings or instructions." 5 The Barker court expressly
recognized that the defectiveness concept "defies a simple, uni-
form definition applicable to all sectors of the diverse product
liability domain."" 6 Barker went on to distinguish manufactur-
ing defects from design defects by explaining that a product that
contains a manufacturing defect deviates from the manufac-
turer's intended result or from other identical units in the same
product line," 17 whereas a product that contains a design defect
ing the risks and utilities to the defendant. See Vargo, New Clothes, supra note 38,
at 544-45.




115 See, e.g., Morris, 735 S.W.2d at 582. But see Colt Indus. Operating Corp. v.
Frank W. Murphy Mfg., 822 P.2d 925, 930 (Alaska 1991) ("The delineation be-
tween design and manufacturing defects is undoubtedly blurry. However, we
have long recognized that overlap between the two categories is unavoidable. We
have clearly stated that rigid delineation of the two categories is neither necessary
nor desirable.").
116 Barker, 573 P.2d at 446.
117 See id. at 454; see, e.g., Escola, 150 P.2d at 439-40.
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may conform perfectly to all of the other similar products in the
line, but all of the products are unsafe because the absence of a
safety device or something inherent in their design creates a
danger. '"
The language of section 402A recognizes only one basis of lia-
bility."19 In practice, however, courts tend to apply different
rules of liability depending on the type of defect alleged. 120 In
the case of a manufacturing defect, liability is often established
by proving the product in question deviated from the design of
other similar products. 121 When the question is one of a design
defect, courts tend to apply either the consumer expectations
test, the risk-utility test, or a combination of the two. 122
e. Summary
Application of the rule of section 402A has been anything but
uniform. Though a majority of jurisdictions across the United
States have adopted verbatim the language of the Restatement
(Second) provision, each court has manipulated the rule to ac-
commodate the facts of a particular case or to conform to the
prevailing policy of the state. Different jurisdictions approach
the strict liability standard from a variety of understandings.
Some adhere to the explanation found in the comments to sec-
tion 402A and impose liability based on consumer expectations.
Others interpret the language of the rule to call for a balancing
test and find liability only where the risks of a product outweigh
its usefulness. Moreover, many jurisdictions do not follow sec-
tion 402A's singular approach to defining a product defect, but
rather distinguish manufacturing defects from design and warn-
ing or instruction defects. The disparity between the rule of
products liability as stated in section 402A and the reality of
products liability as practiced in the nation's courts has led to a
call to revise the Restatement (Second) provision.
I's See Barker, 573 P.2d at 453.
19 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A (liability attaches when a product is "in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user").
120 See Richard N. Pearson, Thoughts for a Restatement of the Law of Products Liabil-
ity, 4 PROD. LAia. LJ. 61, 68 (1993).
121 See Barker, 573 P.2d at 450; Pearson, supra note 120, at 68.
122 See Vandall, supra note 62, at 74-75.
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III. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
In 1992,James Henderson and Aaron Twerski, two prominent
products liability scholars, suggested that section 402A was in
need of reformulation because it no longer reflected current
doctrinal understanding. 23 In a law review article entitled A
Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
these scholars characterized section 402A as moot: the "burning
questions" that section 402A was written to address have been
well settled for years, and the current formulation of products
liability law under the Restatement (Second) provides little to no
help in solving the newest legal controversies. 124 The ALI
agreed that section 402A was out of date125 and appointed Hen-
derson and Twerski to be Reporters for the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability.'2 6 In May 1997, after several years of re-
search and debate, the ALI approved a final draft of the revised
Restatement. 1
27
A. A RESTATEMENT OF THE RULE
Under the Restatement (Third), "[o] ne engaged in the business
of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distrib-
utes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons
or property caused by the defect."128 A commercial seller's lia-
123 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1513 (" [D] octrinal developments
in products liability have placed such a heavy gloss on the original text of and
comments to section 402A as to render them anachronistic and at odds with their
currently discerned objectives.").
124 See id.
125 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY Forward (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1994).
126 See Henderson and Twerski, supra note 1, at 1513. See generally Shapo, supra
note 30, at 655 (The Reporters act as the "wheel-horses" for the Restatement
project; they are responsible for the conducting the majority of the research and
for generating drafts of the Restatement.).
127 Actually, the ALI tentatively approved the Reporters' "Second Tentative"
draft in May 1995, but delayed taking a final vote in order to give scholars more
opportunity to research the current state of products liability law and to com-
ment on the proposed changes. But see David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Ex-
ploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 743, 784 n.199
(1996) [hereinafter Owen, Defectiveness] (The adoption of the second draft was
"'[t]entative' in theory, but largely cast in stone.").
128 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1. The revised Restatement defines a product as
"tangible personal property distributed commercially for use or consumption."
Id. § 19. Under the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) component parts and raw materials
are considered products and are subject to the rule of liability. See id. cmt. b.
Prior to the promulgation of the revised Restatement, the ALI had expressed no
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bility for harm caused by a defective product will no longer be
determined according to a single standard of strict liability.1 29
Instead, a seller's liability will depend upon the type of product
defect involved in each case: a manufacturing defect, a design
defect, or a defect based on inadequate warnings or instruc-
tions.l ' Liability for selling or distributing a product that con-
tains a manufacturing defect is strict,"' whereas liability for
products that are defective because of design or because of inad-
equate instructions or warnings rests upon a reasonableness
test. 132
Despite these significant substantive changes, the Restatement
(Third) retains many of the fundamental provisions of section
402A. For example, the revised Restatement protects a similar
group of potential plaintiffs; where the Restatement (Second) pro-
tected "users and consumers," the Restatement (Third) subjects
sellers to liability where "persons" are harmed by their defective
products.1 33 The new rule similarly applies only to commercial
sellers, that is, those "engaged in the business of selling or other-
wise distributing the type of product that harmed the plain-
tiff;", 1 34 like section 402A, the rule does not affect the liability of
the occasional seller.135 Finally, the Restatement (Third) recog-
opinion as to whether the rule of section 402A applied to the seller of a compo-
nent part of the product. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A. However,
a straightforward application of section 402A against a component seller would
result in liability where the component was manufactured improperly or the com-
ponent supplier was actually the designer of the finished product and the fin-
ished product was flawed. The effect of this new characterization of component
parts may be that component manufacturers will have a duty to warn end product
users about each component in the finished product. See Edward M. Mansfield,
Reflections on Current Limits on Component and Raw Material Supplier Liability and the
Proposed Third Restatement, 84 Ky. L.J. 221, 230 (1996).
129 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2.
130 See id.
'1 See id. § 2(a).
132 See id. § 2(b), (c). One commentator argues that separating defects into
"convenient, legal cubbyholes and.... [applying] different standards of liability
to each category" will result in confusion, and in the confusion "the negligence
exception [will] . . . swallow up the strict liability rule." Vargo, Caveat Emptor,
supra note 90, at 38-40.
133 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. L
134 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1 cmt. c ("The rule does not apply to an occasional
seller or distributor of such products."). Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt.
f.
135 Examples of the occasional seller include those who occasionally sell baked
goods to their neighbors or sell crafts at an occasional church bazaar. See RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) § 1 cmt. c. Whether a defendant is a commercial seller is
usually a question of law to be determined by the court. Id.
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nizes that misuse of the product by a consumer or post-sale
modification or alteration of the product may still provide a de-
fense to the seller.1
36
B. THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH: CATEGORIES OF
PRODUCT DEFECTS
1. Manufacturing Defects
The Restatement (Third) retains the traditional concept of strict
liability as applied to manufacturing defects. 137 A product con-
tains a manufacturing defect when "the product departs from its
intended design."'38 In such a case, a seller or distributor will be
liable for harm caused by such a defect despite the fact that he
exercised all possible care in preparing and marketing the prod-
uct. 39 The rule imposes liability regardless of whether the de-
fendant's quality control efforts satisfy standards of
reasonableness. 4 ° Because the defendant's conduct is not at is-
sue in manufacturing defect cases, the rule does not require a
risk-utility assessment.'41
2. Design Defects
The revised Restatement discards the traditional strict liability
standard with respect to design defects and adopts a reasonable-
ness standard instead: 142 a product is defective in design when
"the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alter-
native design ... and the omission of the alternative design ren-
ders the product not reasonably safe." '143 Comment a explains
that the strict liability standard created for manufacturing de-
fects is inappropriate for design defects. 144 In the context of
manufacturing defects, a defective product is fairly easy to iden-
136 See id. § 2 cmt. p. Under the revised rule, such post-sale conduct is relevant
to the issues of defect and causation if the misuse or modification was so unrea-
sonable and costly to avoid that the seller had no duty to design or warn against
such conduct. See id.
137 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2(a).
138 Id. Common examples are products that are physically flawed, damaged, or
incorrectly assembled. Id. cmt. c.
1s9 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2(a). This standard is almost identical to the
standard stated in section 402A. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
140 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. a.
14 See id. § 1 cmt. a.
142 See id. § 2(b).
143 Id.
144 See id. cmt. a.
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tify; by definition, a defective product is one that fails to meet
the manufacturer's quality standards or fails to perform its in-
tended function. 145 Only a small number of individual products
in a product line will contain manufacturing defects. In the case
of a design defect, however, every product in the line will be
defective. A product with a design defect will meet the manufac-
turer's specifications and quality standards, but still will be un-
reasonably dangerous. 146 Because the manufacturer's standards
are being challenged in a design defect case, they cannot be
used to determine whether a product is defective; rather, courts
must resort to independent standards. 147  The Restatement
(Third), therefore, establishes a reasonableness, or risk-utility,
test as the independent standard. 148
The reasonableness test requires a comparison between the
product design that caused the injury and an alternative de-
sign.' 49 Liability will attach only where the alternative design
would have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm, such that the
failure to incorporate the alternative design was unreasona-
ble. 5 ° The new test for design defects balances the likelihood
and magnitude of injury against the burden of precaution; the
burden of precaution can be either the adoption of a reason-
able alternative design or a conclusion that the product should
never have been marketed. 151 Whether the inclusion of the al-
ternative design would have been reasonable is to be deter-
mined from the point of view of an ordinary person, one who
would weigh the cost of the alternative design, the desirability
and usefulness of the product features, and the potential harms
that the alternative design would avoid.15 2 This test, which is
nearly identical to the traditional negligence standard, assures
145 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1516; see also RESTATEMENT
(THRD) § 2 cmt. c.
146 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. d.
147 See id.
148 See id. § 2(b).
149 See id. cmt. d.
150 The new Restatement would only impose liability when the injury results
from a reasonably foreseeable use of the product. See id. cmt. m. Sellers are not
required to design and market their products so as to avoid the consequences of
unreasonable modes of use. See id. This rule is justified in that careful users
should not be forced to subsidize careless or reckless users. See id.
151 See id. cmt. e; id. Reporters' Note cmt. d.
152 See id. cmts. d, f. But see Shapo, supra note 30, at 664 (arguing that because
courts rarely "muster dollar figures concerning the cost of safety features," the
seeming mathematical precision of the term "risk-utility" is illusory).
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that liability will arise only when the harm was reasonably
preventable.' 53
The reasonableness test would be the only means of establish-
ing liability for injuries caused by defectively designed prod-
ucts.' 54 The Restatement (Third) expressly rejects the consumer-
expectations test as an independent standard forjudging the de-
fectiveness of a product design on the basis that consumer ex-
pectations do not give adequate consideration to the possibility
of a reasonable alternative design.'55 Because consumer expec-
tations relate to the foreseeability and frequency of the risks of
harm, such expectations are relevant under the reasonableness
standard as a factor in the risk-utility calculation; however, they
are not determinative of design defect.
1 56
The Restatement (Third) further requires a plaintiff to prove
that a reasonable alternative design could have been practically
adopted at the time the product was sold. 157 In order to find a
product design defective, a reasonable person must compare
113 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 id. cmt. d; Owen, Defectiveness, supra note 127,
at 760 (by limiting consideration of risks to those that are foreseeable, section
2(b) establishes a negligence principle).
154 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. d. Henderson and Twerski had previ-
ously determined that the consumer-expectations test suffered from "one major,
even fatal flaw: its extreme subjectivity leaves the manufacturer open to the real
possibility of liability without defect." James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski,
Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect,
66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1263, 1295 (1991).
'55 See id. cmt. g.; Henderson & Twerski, supra note 154, at 1295. (After survey-
ing the current state of the law, Henderson and Twerski further conclude that
the consumer expectations test is not widely accepted because many jurisdictions
that purport to adopt the consumer expectations test state the test in risk-utility
terms.).
156 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. g.
157 See id. cmt. d. The proposed Restatement establishes a two-pronged analysis
to determine whether an alternative design (or warning) is reasonable: first, one
must determine whether the alternative was technologically feasible at the time
the product at issue was sold; second, one must determine whether the alterna-
tive was a reasonable market alternative to the product at issue. See Theodore S.
Jankowski, Focusing on Quality and Risk: The Central Role of Reasonable Alternatives in
Evaluating Design and Warning Decisions, 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 283, 339-43 (1995).
The Reporters contend that "very substantial authority" supports their proposi-
tion that a plaintiff must establish a reasonable alternative design in order for a
product to be found defective. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2, Reporters' Note,
cmt. d. (identifying case law and statutes from Alabama, Delaware, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Texas that directly mandate proof of a reasonable alternative
design). They also conclude that cases that adopt the risk-utility analysis require
the plaintiff to establish a reasonable alternative design. See id.
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the product that caused the injury to an alternatively designed
product that meets the same needs and conclude that the alter-
native design was reasonable and its adoption would have re-
duced the risks of foreseeable harm. 158 Comment f suggests a
broad range of factors to consider in determining whether an
alternative design is technologically feasible and practical, and,
thus, reasonable.' 59 Because the alternative design must be "suf-
ficiently safer" than the actual design, the plaintiff must do more
than merely show that the defendant's design could have been
made 'just a little safer."160 The plaintiff, however, is not re-
quired to produce a prototype of the alternatively designed
product; qualified expert testimony will suffice. 16
The Restatement (Third) briefly addresses the common manu-
facturer defenses of "state of the art" and open and obvious dan-
ger, but largely dismisses them as not dispositive. 162  The
comparison of the defendant's product with other competing
designs is relevant to the issue of defectiveness; therefore, manu-
facturers often defend their products on the ground that its de-
sign was the safest in use at the time the product was sold. 63
The Restatement (Third) would allow a defendant to introduce ev-
idence of that fact; however, where the plaintiff introduces ex-
pert testimony that shows that a reasonable alternative design
could have been practicably adopted, the product may be found
defective notwithstanding the product's "state of the art" quali-
ties.164 The new rule also refuses to permit the fact that a prod-
uct's defect created an obvious danger to preclude a finding of
158 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. f But see Vargo, Caveat Emptor, supra
note 90, at 38 (arguing that requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design is
"in reality.... requiring the plaintiff to redesign the product with the knowledge
of the industry that existed at the time of the manufacture. This knowledge in-
cludes knowledge of the danger at the time of manufacture; thus liability is based
upon negligence, not strict liability.").
159 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. f. These factors include the magnitude
of the foreseeable risks, the advantages of the product as designed, and the effect
of the alternative design on production costs. Id.; see also supra notes 52-53 and
accompanying text.
160 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1520.
161 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. f
162 See id. cmt. d.
163 Comment d notes that the term "state of the art" has created some unfortu-
nate confusion because it has been alternatively defined to mean that the prod-
uct design (1) "conforms to industry custom;" (2) "reflects the safest and most
advanced technology developed and in commercial use;" or (3) "reflects technol-
ogy at the cutting edge of scientific knowledge." Id.
164 See id.; Vargo, Caveat Emptor, supra note 90, at 36-37 (suggesting that "state-
of-the-art" means that "[if] the manufacturer is only held to what it knew at the
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defectiveness. 165 An open and obvious danger does not prevent
a plaintiff from proving that a reasonable alternative design
should have been adopted. 166
3. Defects Resulting From Inadequate Warnings or Instructions
The Restatement (Third) also establishes a reasonableness stan-
dard in warning and instruction cases. 167 A product will be
deemed defective because of inadequate warnings or instruc-
tions when "the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product
could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reason-
able instructions or warnings by the seller ... and the omission
of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reason-
ably safe."'168 To avoid a finding that a product is defective be-
cause of inadequate warnings or instructions, the warning or
instruction must alert product users to the existence and nature
of product risks and inform them of how to use the product
safely.' 69 To prevail on a claim of inadequate instructions or
warnings, a plaintiff must prove that adequate warnings were not
provided; this requires a reasonableness approach to testing the
adequacy of the instructions.17 Like design defect cases, inade-
quate warning and instruction cases require an independent as-
sessment of the relevant advantages and disadvantages of the
warning given and other reasonable alternative warnings and in-
structions not given.17  The balancing can be complicated; aproduct must not contain warnings about trivial or far-fetched
time of manufacture, then you are applying negligence... [and] state-of-the-art
swallows the rule of strict liability .... ).
165 Early in the history of products liability law, a finding that the danger cre-
ated by the product was open and obvious precluded recovery. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 2 cmt. c.
166 See id.
167 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2(c). Comment I explains the relationship be-
tween product designs and instructions and warnings: both reasonable designs
and adequate instructions and warnings help achieve higher levels of product
safety. Id. cmt. L In some cases, a proper warning or instruction will suffice to
render a product reasonably safe. Id. But, because users may not receive a warn-
ing or may fail to follow an instruction, when a safer design can be implemented,
such is preferable to marketing the less safe design with warnings and instruc-
tions. Id.
168 Id. § 2(c).
169 See id. cmt. i. When a user has been alerted to a product risk, he or she can
prevent harm by using the product in an appropriate manner or avoiding the
product altogether. See id.
170 See id. § 2(c) cmt. i (providing a careful analysis of the adequacy of instruc-
tions and warnings in light of the specific circumstances of each particular case).
171 See id. cmt. a.
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risks because including these types of warnings may obscure
other warnings about very real risks, and too many warnings may
cause a user to ignore them altogether.
172
Under the Restatement (Third), there is no duty to warn or in-
struct regarding risks that should be obvious to, or generally
known by, product users. 173 Warnings of obvious risks will not
provide effective additional measures of safety and may diminish
the significance of warnings about non-obvious risks.1 74 How-
ever, a product manufacturer or seller must provide warnings
for non-obvious risks and for risks that consumers would deem
material or significant in deciding whether to use or consume
the product. 75 Finally, such warnings should be given to users,
consumers, and "anyone who a reasonable distributor should
know is in a position to respond to the instruction or warning by
reducing or eliminating the risk of injury. 176
4. Summary
In order to bring the Restatement of Torts in line with current
doctrinal understanding of products liability law, the ALI com-
missioned a complete re-drafting of section 402A. The new rule
of products liability presented in the Restatement (Third) rejects
section 402A's unitary approach to product defects and estab-
lishes different tests for liability depending on the type of defect
in question. 77 The Restatement (Third) provision imposes strict
liability only for manufacturing defects and adopts a reasonable-
ness test for design and warning and instruction cases. 178 In de-
sign defect cases, the revised Restatement requires that a plaintiff
prove a reasonable alternative design as a prerequisite to recov-
ery.179 The ALI anticipates that the new rules of the Restatement
172 See id. cmt. i.; cfJankowski, supra note 157, at 329 (noting that a "commonly
held judicial assumption is that all additional warnings effectively reduce the risk
of harm to the user while not causing a material decrease in the product's utility."
This assumption has the effect of refocusing the liability question on whether the
manufacturer withheld any information regarding product risk.).
173 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt.j. The illustration that accompanies com-
ment i explains that the danger of using a step ladder in front of an unlocked
door is so obvious that a ladder manufacturer would have no duty to warn ladder
users about it.
174 See id.
175 See id. cmt. i.
176 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1522.
177 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2.
178 See id.
179 See id. cmt. d.
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(Third) will guide the development of products liability law well
into the twenty-first century. 180
IV. THE REVISED RESTATEMENT: AN ANALYSIS
As illustrated by the discussion in the previous section, the
Restatement (Third) proposes some very significant changes to the
currently accepted expression of products liability law. If the
revised Restatement gained wide acceptance, what would be the
effect of the new rule on manufacturers? On consumers? On
the legal system? On society? This section will consider these
questions as well as others related to the workability of the re-
vised rule and its policy implications.
A. THE WISDOM OF THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
1. Defining Product Defects
The Restatement (Third) presents a workable test for defining
product defects, one with which courts are familiar and have
experience applying. Recall that many of the courts that have
adopted the language of section 402A tend to differentiate be-
tween manufacturing defects, design defects, and products that
are defective because of inadequate warnings or instructions.181
Those courts also apply different rules of liability depending on
the type of defect involved in the case. 8 2 The tripartite division
of product defects presented in the Restatement (Third) reflects
the reality of modern products liability law. The Restatement defi-
nitions of manufacturing defect and design defect are consistent
with the common understanding of those terms as they are used
in contemporary case law. That many jurisdictions indepen-
dently developed, and presently apply, a similar three-part defi-
nition of a product defect further illustrates the workability of
the Restatement approach. 183
180 ALI wraps Up Product Liability Project, supra note 8, at 2777 (citing Henderson
as saying he believes "the restatement will be 'well received' by judges").
181 See supra notes 107-115 and accompanying text. A product that contains a
manufacturing defect deviates from the manufacturer's intended result or from
other identical units in the same product line; a product that contains a design
defect may conform perfectly to all the other similar products in the line, but all
the products are unsafe because of the absence of a safety device or something
inherent in their design creates a danger.
182 See supra notes 107-115 and accompanying text (liability for manufacturing
defects is strict, whereas liability for design defects resembles negligence).
183 Some commentators have criticized Henderson & Twerski's version for
highlighting the differences between defect types, suggesting that the lines be-
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2. Strict Liability for Manufacturing Defects
Strict liability for manufacturing defects is not an unusual,
nor an unpopular, standard. 184 Many familiar policy arguments
justify using the harsh standard in the limited context of manu-
facturing defects. For example, Prosser's risk-spreading ration-
ale supports strict liability for manufacturing defects. That is,
between product sellers, as business entities, and innocent vic-
tims, business entities are in a better position to insure against
losses caused by defective products.' 85 Moreover, manufactur-
ing defect cases are "few and far between," thus, strict liability is
unlikely to result in financial ruin for the manufacturer.'8 6 Sec-
ond, manufacuring defects are often the result of manufacturer
negligence,' 87 but deserving plaintiffs have difficulty proving
such negligence. Therefore, fairness justifies permitting recov-
ery despite the plaintiffs proof problems. 88 Third, strict liabil-
ity for manufacturing defects encourages investment in product
safety because it reduces the chances that defendants will escape
their share of responsibility for product accidents. 89 Finally,
strict liability can be justified in terms of manufacturer expecta-
tions: manufacturers consciously set levels of quality control
and accept that a predictable number of flawed products will
enter the marketplace; manufacturers should not escape liability
tween the types of defect may be fuzzy rather than bright. See, e.g., Jerry J. Phil-
lips, Achilles' Heel 61 TENN. L. REv. 1265, 1269 (1994). To some degree, all
manufacturing defects may be viewed as a form of design defect; as part of every
product's design, manufacturers plan for a predictable rate of failure. See id.
That is, the few individual products that vary from the intended design were a
part of the plan from the beginning. Moreover, the proposed Restatement may
confuse the distinction between defect types by defining a manufacturing defect
in terms of a design defect: a manufacturing defect is one that departs from its
intended design. See Douglas E. Schmidt et al., A Critical Analysis of the Proposed
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 411, 414
(1995).
184 See Phillips, supra note 183, at 1270-71.
185 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. a; see also supra note 26 and accompany-
ing text.
186 See Owen, Defectiveness, supra note 127, at 752.
187 See id.
188 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. a. "Strict liability therefore performs a
function similar to the concept of res ipsa loquitur, allowing deserving plaintiffs
to succeed notwithstanding what would otherwise be difficult or insuperable
problems of proof." Id.
189 See id. Other reasons include (1) strict liability causes product purchase
prices to reflect the high cost of defects and thus discourages consumption of
defective products and (2) strict liability reduces the transaction costs involved in
litigating the issue of manufacturer negligence. See id.
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where they expect it.190 Taken together, these justifications il-
lustrate that the Restatement (Third) correctly retains the strict lia-
bility standard for manufacturing defects.191
3. The Reasonableness Test
A product is not defective merely because it is dangerous; 9 2
rather a product is defective if it creates an unreasonable risk of
harm when used by a consumer in a foreseeable manner. In
choosing a product design, a manufacturer considers the risk of
injury a particular design creates and balances that risk against
the cost, efficiency, and aesthetic value of the design. The rea-
sonableness test of the Restatement (Third) checks the manufac-
turer's balancing. Under the Restatement (Third), the fact finder
must consider the advantages and disadvantages of the design in
question and of reasonable alternative designs to determine
whether the risk created by the design makes the product defec-
tive. 1 93  This test provides the fairest means of weighing the
competing interest involved in a products liability case.' 94 It is
superior to the consumer expectations test that fails to provide
for any objective balancing.1 95 Moreover, using the reasonable-
ness test as the sole test for determining liability for design de-
190 See id.
191 Critics of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) argue that the policy behind section
402A-that of placing the burden of accidental injuries on product sellers-justi-
fies using the strict liability standard in every case, no matter what classification of
defect is present. See, e.g., Vargo, Caveat Emptor, supra note 90, at 47. These critics
maintain that design defects pose a substantial threat of harm to consumers be-
cause the entire line of products is marred by some dangerous condition; in com-
parison, manufacturing defects occur less frequently and pose less of a threat to
consumers. See id. They conclude that by not requiring the strict liability stan-
dard in design and warning cases, a great number of vulnerable consumers will
be denied protection. See id.; see also Angela C. Rushton, Comment, Design Defects
Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: A Reassessment of Strict Liability and the Goals of
a Functional Approach, 45 EMORY L.J. 389, 405-06 (1996) (criticizing the revised
Restatement because it limits the application of strict liability to manufacturing
defects and arguing that by failing to apply strict liability to design and warnings
defects the new rule undermines the policy of consumer protection).
192 Consider a power tool or a kitchen appliance which may be dangerous be-
cause it has sharp edges or generates heat, but is not defective.
193 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. a.
194 See Shapo, supra note 30, at 653. (For example, "computing the costs of
injuries [and] considering the need to maintain incentives for the production of
useful goods .... ").
195 See Owen, Defectiveness, supra note 127, at 761 (The consumer expectations
test operates poorly in the design defect context where "reasonableness, optimal-
ity, and balance are the proper benchmarks of responsibility.").
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fects and defects as a result of inadequate instructions or
warnings will further plaintiff interests; manufacturers will not
be able to use consumer expectations to defeat a cause of action
in a case involving a product with obvious dangers or a case
where the consumer's expectations were particularly undevel-
oped or unfortunately realistic. 1
96
Recent commentary has challenged the Restatement (Third),
contending that the reasonableness test mandated for design
and warning and instruction cases would be too expensive to
administer.197 As written, the reasonableness test requires a
case-by-case analysis of whether a particular product is worth the
risk it creates. While this formulation does involve a time-con-
suming, fact-specific inquiry, it has not been overly burdensome
in those jurisdictions that already apply the risk-utility test or a
combination risk-utility/consumer expectations test. 98 Further-
more, even those jurisdictions that apply only a consumer ex-
pectations test must engage in a case-by-case consideration of
whether a product meets the safety expectations of an ordinary
consumer. 199 In most cases, the question of product defect de-
196 See Owen, The Graying, supra note 63, at 1247. ("[T]he new Restatement
provides necessary shelter to victims of accidents resulting from obvious product
risks that, cheaply and feasibly, could and should have been designed away.").
197 See Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 104, at 865; see generally Henderson &
Twerski, supra note 154, at 1263. Prior to publishing their proposed revisions to
section 402A, Henderson & Twerski rejected the idea of strict liability for all types
of product defects. See id. at 1277. They concluded that imposing liability with-
out requiring proof of defect would complicate the determination of causation
and confuse issues of contributory fault. See id. at 1279-86. The Reporters further
reasoned that imposing liability without defect in design and warning cases would
be socially wasteful:
Since actors react to liability signals on an individual basis rather
than on the group basis upon which the [risk-utility] calculations
were made, they will respond inappropriately [underinvesting in
safety, overengaging in hazardous activity or overinvesting in safety,
underengaging in the activity, and, perhaps, leaving the market al-
together], thereby wasting scarce resources.
Id. at 1288. The Reporters also objected to the "daunting load" that a defendant
would bear if it was saddled with the burden of proving that its product was not
defective. See id. at 1293.
198 Professor Shapo argues that the fact specific nature of products liability de-
mands this kind of case-by-case consideration. See Shapo, supra note 30, at 653.
"Products liability is highly fact oriented, . . in issues of liability as they pertain to
the position of parties in the distributional chain, in problems involving alleged
failures to warn, and in questions of proof... [thus,] products law requires incre-
mental development." Id.
199 See Pearson, supra note 120, at 70.
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serves careful consideration, and, therefore, the reasonableness
test is not only feasible, but also appropriate.
B. THE EFFECTS OF THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION
1. General Considerations
Though the tripartite definition of product defect under the
Restatement (Third) is familiar and workable, in some cases it will
increase the cost of products liability litigation. The conse-
quences of such increased costs, however, are not entirely nega-
tive. For example, in design defect cases under the revised
Restatement, parties will have to retain expert witnesses to testify
to the existence and feasibility of an alternative design.2"0 This
additional cost, if perceived by the parties as burdensome, may
encourage settlement.0
In almost every case, parties will face additional litigation re-
lated to how the alleged defect should be characterized. 20 2 One
can expect lawyers to have intense arguments over "defect typ-
ing" as the issue may very well determine the outcome of the
lawsuit.20 3 There will likely also be litigation over what consti-
tutes an alternative to a defective product.20 4 Some commenta-
200 Cf Richard L. Cupp, Defining the Boundaries of "Alternative Design" Under the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: The Nature and Role of Substitute Products in Design Defect
Analysis, 63 TENN. L. REv. 329, 336 (1996) (arguing that such additional litigation
costs may have the effect of immunizing defendants from all but a few substantial
claims).
20, Trial expenses are a factor that weigh heavily on both sides in a decision to
settle a case. Though it is generally believed that the burden of an expensive trial
weighs more heavily on a plaintiff than a defendant, in class action suits litigation
expenses arguably weigh evenly on both parties and serve to deter both plaintiffs
and defendants from pushing for trial.
202 Cf Vargo, Caveat Emptor, supra note 90, at 46-47. ("[S]uch categories of
defects are taken from the manufacturer's view .... The consumer could care
less about such categories.").
203 See Corboy, supra note 13, at 1090 (different standards of liability attach to
different types of defects).
204 See Schmidt et al., supra note 183, at 418. See also Shapo, supra note 30, at
675-76 (illustrating that skilled attorneys may be able to re-characterize a "reason-
able alternative design" as a more expensive substitute in a separate product cate-
gory); Cupp, supra note 200, at 330 ("Plaintiffs may... win or lose design cases
based on how freely the courts allow them to roam in searching for reasonable
alternatives."). Cupp maintains that the search for comparable alternatives is the
preliminary step in determining defectiveness. See Cupp, supra note 200, at 330.
Under Cupp's analysis, whether an alternative is suitable for comparison to the
product in question can be determined by considering the following factors: (1)
closeness of function; (2) closeness of risk; (3) closeness of appearance; (4) cross-
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tors argue, for example, that defense attorneys will attempt to
define "alternatives" narrowly, arguing that any change in the
design of the product sufficiently changes the nature of the
product such that it must be considered an entirely different
product and that the different design cannot be used for pur-
poses of determining design defect.20 5 Plaintiffs' attorneys, on
the other hand, will seek to define the alternatives broadly.
206
These new issues, however, will not necessarily increase the sys-
tem-wide costs of products liability litigation. The cost of litigat-
ing the existence of an alternative design could only be
considered an additional expense in jurisdictions that do not
already require such proof. Moreover, the new approach may
result in more cases being disposed of at the summary judgment
stage; if so, the great expenditure of community resources,
which occurs at the trial stage, would be avoided. Finally,
though additional litigation is generally undesirable, the ex-
pense would be justified if consideration of these arguments re-
sulted in fairer and more reliable outcomes.
2. Barriers to Plaintiff Recovery
One of the great triumphs of the Restatement (Second) section
402A was that it imposed "strict liability" on manufacturers for
injuries caused by their defective products and, thus, increased a
plaintiffs chances of recovery.20 7 Indeed, section 402A elimi-
nated almost all of the traditional barriers to plaintiff recovery
and represents a high water mark in the pro-plaintiff move-
ment.208 The Restatement (Third), however, reflects the opinion
that consumers are better able to take care of themselves than
was believed when the ALI adopted the Restatement (Second) and,
therefore, that section 402A is too generous in its commitment
to consumer protection. 0 9
elasticity of demand, an economic concept that includes all of the factors that
consumers take into account when deciding whether another safer product will
meet the same need; and (5) consumer autonomy to choose cost and utility ben-
efits over increased safety. See id. at 363-67.
205 See Cupp, supra note 200, at 330.
206 See id.
207 See Shapo, supra note 30, at 689 ("Another idea supporting the develop-
ment of section 402A inheres in the supposition that the traditional negligence
rules of proof create hurdles that are too high for many plaintiffs with meritori-
ous cases.").
208 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
209 See Shapo, supra note 30, at 689-90.
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To correct the perceived favoritism shown to plaintiffs, the Re-
statement (Third) admittedly places a few "obstacles" in the path
of plaintiff recovery. For example, the existence of a reasonable
alternative design was only one factor in the risk-utility analysis
under section 402A, but it is an element of the plaintiff's prima
facie case under the revised Restatement.210 In design defect
cases under the Restatement (Third), the plaintiff must conquer
the additional hurdle of proving a reasonable alternative design
or suffer a directed verdict.211 Commentators have expressed
concern that, in requiring a reasonable alternative design as an
additional element of the plaintiffs case, the new Restatement
does not consider that there may be some products for which
there is no safe alternative.1 2 They argue that by eliminating
the "unreasonably dangerous" language and substituting the re-
quirement of a reasonable alternative design, a person injured
by an unsafe product may not recover if there is no way to make
the product at issue safe. 3 These criticisms ignore that the rea-
sonableness test would allow the jury to find that the alternative
would have been to not manufacture the product at all. Fur-
thermore, this requirement would only be a new hurdle in those
jurisdictions that apply the consumer expectations test to deter-
mine defectiveness. Currently, most jurisdictions that follow a
risk-utility approach require the plaintiff to prove that an alter-
native design would have reduced the risk of harm without mak-
210 See Corboy, supra note 13, at 1092-93. Cf Schmidt et al., supra note 183, at
419 ("The existence of a [reasonable alternative design] is not a necessary ele-
ment of the risk-utility test .... [The test] is essentially a comparative approach
which can allow the jury to evaluate many different factors, including . . . the
availability of alternative designs without being a rigid condition precedent to
recovery.").
211 See Corboy, supra note 13, at 1088 (criticizing the revised Restatement be-
cause it may have the effect of limiting the access of injured plaintiffs to a jury
verdict). The Reporters may have intended that juries decide fewer products lia-
bility cases; both have expressed doubt that juries are competent to handle com-
plicated products liability cases. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review
of Manufacturer's Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L.
REv. 1531 (1973); Aaron D. Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations: En-
hancing the Role of Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 861 (1983).
212 Professor Shapo points to products that have recently been the subject of
"mass tort" litigation such as asbestos, the Dalkon Shield, and silicon gel breast
implants as examples of defective products for which no reasonable alternative
exists. See Shapo, supra note 30, at 671-73; see also Schmidt et al., supra note 183,
at 417.
21- See Shapo, supra note 30, at 671-73.
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ing the product impracticable. 214  Thus, the "obstacles" to
plaintiff recovery erected by the revised Restatement, while
greater than those explicitly stated in section 402A, do not, by
any means, make plaintiff recovery impossible.
3. Effects on Manufacturer Liability
At first glance, the Restatement (Third) and its accompanying
reasonableness standards for design and warning and instruc-
tion cases may seem to increase the possibility that a manufac-
turer of a finished product will escape liability. This would be
true only if the courts currently applied strict liability in the ma-
jority of products cases. If the Reporters are correct in conclud-
ing that most jurisdictions presently apply a balancing
standard21 5 and that the strict liability language is merely "rhe-
torical preference, 21 6 then there should be no appreciable de-
crease in plaintiff recovery in those cases that are submitted to a
jury.
C. THE TIMING OF THE NEW RESTATEMENT
Section 402A no longer reflects the current practice of prod-
ucts liability law;2 17 thus, the Restatement (Second) provision is -in
need of revision. Critics of the ALI project argue that products
214 See also MichaelJ. Toke, Note, Restatement (Third) of Torts and Design Defective-
ness in American Products Liability Law, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 239, 283-85
(1996) (noting that legislation in six states and judicial decision in sixteen other
states mandate proof of a reasonable alternative design).
215 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1 cmt. a. According to the Reporters, many
courts that apply a reasonableness test to determine liability insist on speaking of
such liability as being "strict." See id. Courts use the strict liability label in design
defect cases if the product causes injury while being put to a reasonably foresee-
able use because the seller is held to have known of the risks of such use and
imputed knowledge is more often associated with strict liability than with negli-
gence. See id. Courts also use "strict liability" to avoid characterizing the test as
being based in negligence and, thus, to limit the defense of comparative fault.
See id. Moreover, some courts call it strict liability because non-manufacturing
sellers in the distributive chain are subject to strict liability. See id.
216 Other commentators have concluded that a substantial number ofjurisdic-
tions still rely heavily on the consumer expectations test. See Shapo, supra note
30, at 665 (reviewing several of the cases relied on by the Reporters to advance
their proposition that the reasonableness test should be the sole test for deter-
mining defect and concluding that the cases do not confirm Henderson & Twer-
ski's proposition); Howard Klemme, Comments to the Reporters and Selected Members
of the Consultative Group, Restatement of Torts (Third): Products Liability, 61 TENN. L.
REv. 1173, 1174-76 (1994).
217 See supra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
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liability law is too unsettled for a Restatement to be possible." 8
They advocate delaying the promulgation of any Restatement un-
til state legislatures and courts have had an opportunity to re-
solve the "burning questions" of products liability for
themselves. 1 9 Such criticism ignores the fact that the ALI
adopted section 402A at a time when strict liability in tort was
only beginning to emerge as a distinct legal concept. 220 Section
402A became the foundation for much of modern products lia-
bility law because it offered courts a framework for liability built
upon strong policy considerations and solid research. The Re-
statement (Third) is similarly well-researched and thoroughly rea-
soned. Those courts and legislatures currently considering
important questions related to products liability need such a Re-
statement, one which also reflects a coherent set of rules, to pro-
vide guidance for the development of products liability law in
their jurisdictions. Once again, the ALI has a unique opportu-
nity to shape the future of products liability with its timely re-
lease of a Restatement of the law.221
D. CONCLUSION
The frustration of courts and commentators in struggling to
sort out the conflicts and inconsistencies associated with section
402A spurred the ALL to undertake to write a Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability. With no absolute majority ofjurisdic-
tions behind any one approach, the revised Restatement repre-
sents what the Reporters determined is the best rule for
products liability law. The new Restatement differs substantively
from the Restatement (Second) in that the new rule includes an
explicit recognition of three distinct categories of product de-
fects, a rejection of a strict liability standard for design defects,
and a requirement that a plaintiff in a design defect case prove a
218 See Schmidt et al., supra note 183, at 419 (suggesting that the Restatement
(Third) is an attempt by the Reporters to remake, reshape, or revise the law rather
than an effort to summarize and capsulize the law).
219 See, e.g., Shapo, supra note 30, at 685-86 ("[O]n matters where the law is
truly in the process of development, a Restatement should maximize opportuni-
ties for courts to identify and resolve unsettled issues for themselves.").
220 See Pearson, supra note 120, at 66.
221 See Corboy, supra note 13, at 1074; see also Prosser, The Fall supra note 26, at
803. But see Pearson, supra note 120, at 62 (suggesting that the effect of the re-
vised Restatement may be minimal because those jurisdictions that have products
liability statutes will not be able to judicially adopt the new rule and other juris-
dictions which have a developed body of products liability case law may be reluc-
tant to abandon precedent).
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reasonable alternative design. Despite these significant changes,
the Restatement (Third) presents a workable rule-a rule that
closely resembles the risk-utility approach currently followed in
several jurisdictions. Furthermore, the Restatement (Third) is sup-
ported by carefully reasoned policy considerations: policies that
recognize the need for consumer protection and that attempt to
balance such needs against a manufacturer's ability to design
reasonably safe products. While no single rule of liability is
likely to satisfy all of the competing interests in our society, the
Restatement (Third) does a very good job of summarizing those
facets of products liability for which there is substantial agree-
ment; and, where there is no agreement, the Restatement (Third)
adequately develops rules that reflect sound public policy.
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